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The ability to detect and process errors made by others plays an important role is many social contexts. The capacity to process
errors is typically found to rely on sites in the medial frontal cortex. However, it remains to be determined whether responses at
these sites are driven primarily by action errors themselves or by the affective consequences normally associated with their
commission. Using an experimental paradigm that disentangles action errors and the valence of their affective consequences, we
demonstrate that sites in the medial frontal cortex (MFC), including the ventral anterior cingulate cortex (vACC) and pre-
supplementary motor area (pre-SMA), respond to action errors independent of the valence of their consequences. The strength
of this response was negatively correlated with the empathic concern subscale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index. We also
demonstrate a main effect of self-identification by showing that errors committed by friends and foes elicited significantly
different BOLD responses in a separate region of the middle anterior cingulate cortex (mACC). These results suggest that the
way we look at others plays a critical role in determining patterns of brain activation during error observation. These findings may
have important implications for general theories of error processing.
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INTRODUCTION
The ability to recognize our own errors and their conse-
quences, and to use this information to modify our future
behaviors, is important for many forms of learning ranging
from the acquisition of basic motor skills to the more
sophisticated refinement of complex social and interpersonal
abilities. Neuroscientific investigations conducted over the
last two decades have provided converging evidence that
sites in the medial frontal cortex (MFC) are critically
involved in error processing (see Ridderinkhof et al., 2004
for review). For example, data from a number of experi-
ments indicate that action execution errors typically result
in a negative deflection in event-related brain potentials
(ERP) at a latency of 100 ms (Falkenstein et al., 1991;
Gehring et al., 1993). Source localization of this event-related
negativity (ERN), as well as data from fMRI experiments,
suggest that sites in the MFC form the brain basis of this
error-processing mechanism (Holroyd and Coles, 2002;
Ridderinkhof et al., 2004 for meta-analysis; Holroyd et al.,
2005; Kennerley et al., 2006). Additionally, a feedback-
related negativity (FRN), thought to be distinct from the
ERN (Gehring and Willoghby, 2004) can be observed
following negative feedback. This signal has a similar scalp
distribution to the ERN but occurs at a longer latency
(250 ms) (Miltner et al., 1997). Critically, areas within
the MFC have also been shown to be responsive to observa-
tion of errors committed by others (Van Schie et al., 2004;
De Bruijn et al., submitted for publication).
While the general functional basis of error processing is
largely agreed upon, most experiments conducted to date
have defined errors in a very narrow, and indeed problematic
way. In each of the experiments cited above the commission
or observation of an action error was perceived as a negative
event, i.e. errors resulted in worse performance, decreased
monetary rewards or both. While the reason for this associa-
tion is obvious, self-generated errors committed in the real
world are usually associated with negative affective conse-
quences, it renders the resulting MFC activations difficult to
interpret in light of recent theories of MFC activity.
Currently, researchers have linked MFC activity to both
action errors and the negative affective consequences asso-
ciated with their commission (Miltner et al., 1997; Holroyd
and Coles, 2002; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004). One may pose
the question, does activation of the MFC result from the
execution/observation of action errors per se, the negative
affective consequences which typically follow such events,
or both? An additional limitation of contemporary error-
execution paradigms is that the results are not necessarily
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useful for understanding observed errors committed in a
social context. In such situations, the affective consequences
of an observed error can be either positive or negative
depending on who commits the error.
In the present experiment, we tried to separate out these
two confounding factors by creating a design in which, in the
one case, observed action errors would have negative affec-
tive consequences, whereas in the other case, similar errors
would have positive affective consequences. More specifi-
cally, our experiment uses the idea of socially constructed
realities to provide a framework in which to investigate error
processing. It has been suggested that, through social inter-
actions, people continuously define and redefine their sub-
jective realities (Macionis and Plummer, 2002). One way in
which we do this is by forming attachments to groups based
on defining concepts such as nationality, family or gender.
Indeed, scientists have attempted to quantify the extent to
which we identify with such groups. This tendency has been
termed ‘self identification’. Research on this topic suggests
that, to the extent that we identify with a given group we
tend to adopt their views, goals and interpretation of the
world (cf. Wann and Branscombe, 1993; Troop and
Wright, 2001; Wann et al., 2001). For example, it is likely
that members of Allied Nations reacted to reports of D-day
with a smile whereas members of Axis nations probably
reacted with a frown. Other examples of self-identification
are readily found in the domain of sports where mistakes of
an opponent (team) are typically received with much enthu-
siasm, whereas similar mistakes of a team member generally
result a negative response or evaluation. Typically, whereas
for self generated errors, affective consequences are generally
negative, for observed errors the evaluation largely depends
on the context and whether you do or do not self-identify
with the person making the mistake. While it is easy to see
how identification with others could introduce very strong
and specific biases in behavior, it is currently unclear how
such behavioral biases might be supported neurally.
In order to determine whether the MFC is mainly acti-
vated by the affective component that typically accompanies
errors or to the error per se, irrespective of the emotional
consequence, we conducted an action observation experi-
ment in which full brain fMRI was recorded at 3 T while
strong Dutch and German soccer fans watched virtual pen-
alty shootouts between their national team (friend) and a
rival team (foe). Our primary hypothesis was that observa-
tion of action errors would elicit more MFC activity than
goals, regardless of the valence of the associated psychological
consequences. This would argue for a functional role of the
MFC in the processing action errors, irrespective of context
and the emotional consequences for the observer. The second
hypothesis, however, predicts that error processing in the
MFC is mainly a reflection of the negative results that usually
accompany action errors. In the latter case MFC would need
to be activated differentially to action errors committed by an
opponent (foe) and a preferred own team (friend).
These questions and hypotheses are important to emer-
ging theories of observational learning as well as joint action
which posit a critical reliance on our ability to distinguish
correct from incorrect behavior in order to adjust future
actions to avoid possible negative affective consequences
already experienced by another. In order to better under-
stand the functional role of the MFC in error processing
and possible differences that exist between individuals in
this respect, we included questionnaires to investigate
whether differences in MFC activation would be correlated
with measures of empathy and self identification (Table 1).
Empathy was assessed using the Interpersonal Reactivity
Index (IRI), a 28 item questionnaire which contains four
seven-item subscales designed to measure four facets of
empathy (Davis, 1980). These include perspective taking
(tendency to adopt the viewpoint of others), empathic con-
cern (tendency to experience compassion), personal distress
(tendency to experience discomfort in response to distress
experienced by others) and fantasy (tendency to imagine
oneself in fictional situations). The perspective taking and
fantasy subscales are designed to measure the nonaffective,
cognitive aspects of empathy and the empathic concern and
personal distress scale assess the emotional aspects of empa-
thy (Davis et al., 1994; Alterman et al., 2003; Lawrence et al.,
2006; Rankin et al., 2006). We assessed self identification
using the Sport Spectator Identification Scale (SSIS) which
we modified to test the extent to which Dutch participants
were fans of the Dutch national soccer team and German
participants were fans of the German national soccer team.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Subjects
A total of 22 participants (19–43 years old, mean age 24
years, one female, 21 male, two left-handed, 17 Dutch fans,
five German fans) participated in the fMRI experiment.
Because events were coded relative to the fandom of the
Table 1 Sample questions from the questionnaires used in the experiment.
Measure Sample Question
IRI-PT I try to look at everybody’s side of a disagreement
before I make a decision.
IRI-FS After seeing a play or movie, I have felt as though
I were one of the characters.
IRI-EC I believe there are two sides to every question and try to
look at them both.
IRI-PD In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill at ease.
SFQ I view myself as a soccer fan.
SSIS How big a fan of the Dutch soccer team would you
say you are?
Love How much do you love the Dutch/German soccer team.
Dislike How much do you dislike the German/Dutch soccer team.
PT¼ Perspective Taking Subscale, FS¼ Fantasy Subscale, EC¼ Empathic Concern
Subscale, PD¼ Personal Distress Subscale, SFQ¼ Sports Fandom Questionnaire.
Participants were asked how much they loved and disliked their and the opponent
team.
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participants (e.g. a Dutch player is a friend of a Dutch fan
but a foe of a German fan and vice versa), whether a subject
was a Dutch of German fan was not a confounding factor.
All participants were healthy adults (self-report) and gave
written informed consent according to the institutional
guidelines set forth by the local ethics committee (CMO
region Arnhem-Nijmegen, the Netherlands) prior to the
experiment. Subjects were compensated at the rate of 10
Euros per hour for their participation.
Stimuli
Video clips of individual penalty shots were recorded during
penalty shootouts made using the XBOX 360 version of the
2006 FIFA (Fe´de´ration Internationale de Football
Association) World Cup soccer game (Electronic Art
Nederland B.V., Hoensbroek, the Netherlands). Average
duration of each penalty shot was 5 s. A coaxial cable con-
nected the Xbox 360 to the ASUS AGP-V3800Pro V31.40H
graphics card of a standard computer running on Microsoft
Windows 2000, transferring the video-sync and video with-
out audio through a composite-video signal. The video was
digitally recorded on the computer with ASUS digital VCR
2.5, using a resolution of 720 480 pixels. Every penalty shot
was converted to an AVI video clip using EZ Video
Converter 1.2, with the original frame rate and Ligos
Indeo Video 5.11 video codec. Only players who were on
the Dutch and German national teams during the actual
World Cup 2006 were included. All clips were made using
the same virtual stadium at the same time of day and in
identical weather conditions. Additionally, shots were
matched across teams for shot angle and direction in
which the keeper moved.
Clip selection
A total of five participants (19–24 years old; one female, one
left-handed) participated in a separate experiment, to judge
clarity of results of the clips. Participants were shown 470
candidate video clips (selected on the basis of technical real-
ism from a pool of 600 original clips by a certified soccer
referee). While seated in a chair behind a table, subjects
watched the clips on a computer screen from a distance of
80 cm, with the screen subtending the same visual angle as in
the fMRI setting. Participants rated the video clips on clarity
of results, using a 3-point Likert scale (1¼ goal, 2¼miss,
3¼ unclear). These data were used to select only video
clips with an unambiguously clear result (either a goal or a
miss) for use in the fMRI experiment. After the pilot study,
35 goals and 35 misses were selected for each of the two
teams (the Netherlands, Germany), matching them across
teams in terms of shot angles and direction in which the
keeper moved. The video clips were then divided into two
games between Germany and The Netherlands. Each game
consisted of seven rounds of penalty shootouts between the
two teams, resulting in a winner per round and a winner per
game. To avoid predictability, the clips were arranged in
different scenarios in which we varied total number of
kicks in which the shootout was decided (6–14), duration
of shootout rounds (M¼ 1.67 min, s.d.¼ 0.43), beginning
team, and last team to shoot and whether a round would
end on the basis of a goal or a miss.
Procedure
Prior to scanning, subjects completed questionnaires asses-
sing handedness, team identification with their national
soccer team (SSIS-Voetbal, an 8-point Likert scale, based
on the SSIS; Wann and Branscombe, 1993), soccer fandom
[SFQ-Voetbal, an 8-point Likert scale, adapted from the
Sport Fandom Questionnaire (SFQ; Wann et al., 2001)]
and general empathy (a 5-point Likert scale and Dutch
translation of the IRI; Davis, 1980). Following scanning, sub-
jects completed an exit questionnaire in which they reported
their team preferences by ordinally ranking the teams [from
most (1) to least (4) liked] and reported the degree to which
they liked and disliked each of the teams (scale of 1–100).
Results were analyzed with SPSS, version 15.
All data was acquired during a single fMRI scanning ses-
sion which lasted approximately 1.5 h (M¼ 77.8 min.,
s.d.¼ 1.6 min.). Video stimuli were presented using a pro-
jector and viewed by subjects lying in the scanner bed
through a custom made mirror (Figure 1). All stimuli were
delivered using Presentation software version 9.90
(Neurobehavioral Systems, Davis, CA, USA) run on a Dell
Workstation (Austin, TX, USA). Subjects were instructed to
concentrate on the video clips while in the scanner.
Following 20% of trials, subjects were queried concerning
the outcome of the previously viewed penalty shot. The
response screen contained a green square on the right side
Fig. 1 (A) Frame capture taken from the beginning of one of the penalty shot
videos illustrating the perspective from which actions were viewed. The scoreboard in
the upper right quadrant was updated with green (goal) and red (miss) circles in the
appropriate rows following each shot. (B) Illustration of the general structure of the
scanning run. Participants viewed two macro-games between the Dutch and German
teams. Each macro-game consisted of seven mini-games. Between mini-games,
participants were updated on the overall score between the Netherlands and
Germany. Each mini-game was similar in structure to an actual penalty-shootout
with the winner being decided based on current FIFA guidelines (see Methods
section). (C) Timecourse of a single penalty shootout within a mini-game. Notably,
each clip was shown twice to ensure participants could accurately categorize misses
and goals. Queries concerning the outcome (miss or goal?) followed 20% of the trials.
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and a red square on the left side, or vice versa, where green
symbolized ‘goal’ and red symbolized ‘miss’. Subjects
responded with an fMRI compatible gamepad using either
the left or right index finger depending on the result of the
video and the location of the red and green squares. Each of
the two macro-games started with a Start clip (35 s), showing
the stadium and the lineup of both teams and ended with a
cheering clip (20 s), showing the winning team cheering and
the losing team grieving. Each macro-game was introduced
by a text screen indicating the number of the game (1–4)
and the teams playing (Netherlands–Germany, Germany–
Netherlands). Within each macro-game, each of the seven
penalty shootouts were introduced by a text screen indicat-
ing the number of the game (1–7) and the current number of
penalty shootouts won by each team. The shootout then
proceeded in the following manner. A video of a player of
team A taking a shot on goal was played two times in a row
(duration¼ 10 s). This was followed, in 20% of the trials by
a quiz regarding the outcome of the observed action
(duration¼ 2 s). The same sequence of events was repeated,
in this case featuring a player of team B taking the penalty
kick. This procedure repeated until a winner was established.
Following the standard FIFA regulations for penalty shoot-
outs, teams took turns in taking penalty kicks, until each
team had taken five kicks. In the case that one team scored
more goals than the other could possibly reach with all of
their remaining kicks (e.g. 3-0 after three kicks each), the
shootout ended. If however, at the end of five kicks both
teams had scored an equal number of goals (e.g. 4-4), the
shootout continued with rounds of one kick until one side
scored and the other missed. A scoreboard indicating the
progress of the teams within a shootout round was overlayed
in the upper right quadrant of the shootout clips. The order
of macro-games and penalty shootouts were randomized, as
was the selection of individual clips within the penalty shoot-
outs (although, the sequence of goals and misses within each
penalty shootout was predetermined based on the final
score). The end of each of the macro-games was marked
by presentation of the cheering clip followed by a text
screen indicating which team had won the macro-game.
All text screens were presented in the native language of
the participant. Brain signal measured during observation
of penalty shots was subsequently entered into SPM2 for
analysis.
Design
The results of an observed clip (Goal, Miss), Team (Friend,
Foe) and Self-Identification as measured by an adapted ver-
sion of the SSIS (mean SSIS scores; Wann and Branscombe,
1993) administered prior to fMRI scanning were treated as
within-subjects variables. Soccer fandom as measured by an
adaptation of the SFQ (mean SFQ scores; Wann et al., 2001)
and empathy as measured by the IRI (mean IRI scores;
Davis, 1980) were also measured. Based on the results of
the SSIS, we were able to assign the videos within the
shootouts as Friend or Foe. Differential anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC) activity was considered the primary dependent
variable of interest.
fMRI data acquisition
All imaging data was collected at the F.C. Donders Centre for
Cognitive Neuroimaging (Nijmegen, The Netherlands).
Functional images were acquired on a Trio 3T whole-body
MR scanner (Siemens, Erlangen, Germany) using an ascend-
ing slice acquisition sequence and a birdcage head coil
(TR¼ 2.50 s, TE¼ 35 ms, 908 flip-angle, 34 axial slices,
slice-matrix size¼ 64 64, slice thickness¼ 3 mm, slice
gap¼ 0.5 mm, FOV¼ 22.4 mm, voxel size¼ 3.5 3.5 3.5 mm).
A single scanning block lasted 80 min, depending on the
reaction times of the participants (M¼ 78.25 min,
s.d.¼ 2.29). Following echo planar image (EPI) acquisition,
a T1-weighted 3D MPRAGE sequence (volume
TR¼ 1960 ms, TE¼ 4.43 ms, 88 flip-angle, 176 coronal
slices, slice-matrix size¼ 256 208, slice thickness¼
1.0 mm, voxel size¼ 1 1 1 mm) was acquired.
fMRI data analysis
Functional data were preprocessed and analyzed using SPM2
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). All functional data were
first corrected for motion artifacts using the bilinear inter-
polation method and coregistered with the high resolution
T2-weighted anatomical image. Images were then normalized
to the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) template with
a resolution of 2 2 2 mm, and smoothed in three dimen-
sions using a 6 6 6 mm Gaussian kernel. The following
events were modeled: Goal_Friend, Miss_Friend, Goal_Foe,
Miss_Foe. In general, these events were modeled in terms of
the actual videos of penalty shots viewed by the participants.
The precise temporal window over these video events dif-
fered depending on which contrasts were analyzed. In the
first analysis, events were modeled as the entire time during
which videos of soccer shots (both repetitions) were played
in a given condition. This broad model was used in contrasts
designed to compare activity during general observation of
the self-identified and nonself-identified teams (e.g. Friend >
Foe and Foe > Friend). In the second analysis, events were
modeled as the second half of the first repetition of each
movie. This portion of the movie included the outcome
(error/goal) and was designed to achieve better signal
strength in areas related to error observation. This second,
more focused model was used in comparisons of BOLD
signal relating to error and reward processes. In all cases,
brain responses were first modeled separately for individual
subjects using the general linear model and subsequently
entered into random effects analyses using SPM2. The data
was high-pass filtered to remove potential unwanted effects
of scanner drift. This potential confound was further
addressed by ensuring that events of interest (misses and
goals) were equally likely to occur both early and late in
the scanning session. In the second-level analysis, contrasts
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were created according to the logic of the hypotheses
described in the Introduction section. Based on previous
research, we restricted our error processing region of interest
to the medial frontal cortex. Initial analysis of the fMRI
data revealed that, in general, activation in the ACC was
significantly higher when viewing foes as compared to
friends (see Discussion section). For this reason, we avoided
comparisons in which BOLD signal during Friend and Foe
were directly compared without a baseline (i.e. Goal_Foe,
Goal_Friend, etc.). Instead, we investigated ACC activation
during processing of errors using an intersection analysis.
Using a technique adopted in previous research (Newman-
Norlund et al., 2007) we calculated the intersection of sta-
tistical parametric maps for (Miss_Foe–Goal_Foe) and
(Miss_Friend–Goal_Friend) to localize brain areas in which
BOLD signal was related to observation of misses indepen-
dent of the affective consequences and the intersection of
(Goal_Foe–Miss_Foe) and (Miss_Friend–Goal_Friend) to
localize brain areas in which BOLD signal was related to
the affective consequences independent of action outcome.
Cluster sizes adopted to correct for multiple comparisons
were based on voxels in EPI space. Individual comparisons
in these intersections were thresholded at P< 0.01, 5-voxel
extent, so that the resulting intersection had a chance of
P< 0.001 of occurring by chance. We adopted a threshold
of P< 0.001 uncorrected, 5-voxel extent for activations in the
contrasts designed to localize MFC sites in which misses
elicited greater activation when committed by either friends
or foes (e.g. [MISSFRIEND–GOALFRIEND]–[MISSFOE–
GOALFOE], and the reverse contrast). Such thresholds are
justified in light of the fact that we had specific a priori
hypotheses concerning activation in the medial frontal
cortex. Taken together with the fact that we find strong
correlations between MFC activations and subscales of the
IRI, it is unlikely these activations are false positives (Type I
errors). All reported activations falling outside the MFC were
minimally significant at P< 0.001 uncorrected, 10-voxel
extent, which is more typically adopted for whole brain ana-
lyses in the absence of specific predictions. Coordinates in
MNI space were converted into Talairach space using the
nonlinear method of C.M. Lacadie and colleagues (sub-
mitted for publication). All regression analyses reported in
the current article were conducted using the first eigen-vari-
ates which were extracted from the second-level analyses
models (random effects models, SPM.mat) using the VOI
toolbox in SPM2. Here, we report bivariate Pearson correla-
tions between eigen-variates and the IRI (and subscales when
appropriate) and SSIS.
RESULTS
Behavioral results
The mean ranking of the teams according to the exit form
was Friend (M¼ 1.00, s.d.¼ 0.00) and Foe, (M¼ 2.00,
s.d.¼ 0.94). In order to test whether fans strongly liked
their own teams and disliked the opposition teams we per-
formed two separate repeated measures ANOVAs on the
scores of love for and dislike of the teams, as measured by
the exit forms. A significant difference was found in how
much subjects loved the teams (Huynh–Feldt Epsilon-
corrected F2.78, 58.33¼ 49.10, P< 0.001). Results of the
Helmert contrasts indicated that subjects loved their
own team (Friend) more than the other team (Foe)
(F1,21¼ 118.24, P< 0.001). Similarly, a significant differ-
ence was found in how much subjects disliked the
teams (Huynh–Feldt Epsilon-corrected F2.16, 45.43¼ 12.95,
P< 0.001), with dislike scores for foes being significantly
higher than those for other teams (F1,21¼ 9.06, P< 0.01)
(Table 2). Bivariate Pearson’s correlations between the ques-
tionnaires are also reported (Table 3).
Accuracy and reaction time data obtained from the forced
choice (Goal–Miss) questions which followed 20% of the
trials were subjected to statistical analysis in SPSS. A repeated
measures ANOVA using accuracy as the dependent variable,
team as within-subjects variable and empathy subscales as
covariates revealed a nonsignificant main effects of Team
(Huynh–Feldt Epsilon-corrected F1.71, 25.69¼ 0.66, P¼ 0.66)
and empathy subscales (Huynh–Feldt Epsilon-corrected
F1, 15 < 0.71, P> 0.41) and no significant interaction effects
between Team empathy subscales (Huynh–Feldt Epsilon-
corrected F1.71, 25.69 < 2.34, P> 0.12). Similarly, when using
reaction times as the independent variable, the main effects
of Team (Huynh–Feldt Epsilon-corrected F1.59, 27.08¼ 0.44,
P¼ 0.60) and empathy subscales (Huynh–Feldt Epsilon-
corrected F1, 17 < 0.66, P> 0.43), as well as all interaction
terms were insignificant (Huynh–Feldt Epsilon-corrected
F1.59, 27.08 < .337, P> .64).
fMRI results
To distinguish between theories of MFC function based on
error observation and their consequences we first deter-
mined brain areas evincing greater signal strength during
observation of errors as compared to observation of goals.
First, we calculated the intersection (MISSFRIEND–
GOALFRIEND) \ (MISSFOE–GOALFOE), with results from
Table 2 Minimum, maximum, mean value and standard deviations for
questionnaires used in the current experiment.
Measure Minimum Maximum Mean Standard
Deviation
IRI-PT 2.14 4.43 3.48 0.67
IRI-FS 2.00 4.57 3.44 0.65
IRI-EC 2.14 4.29 3.38 0.54
IRI-PD 1.13 4.00 2.41 0.54
SFQ 2.00 8.00 5.62 1.67
SSIS 3.13 7.13 4.91 1.10
Love-friend 20.00 100 86.40 16.62
Dislike-friend 1.00 30.00 5.08 7.70
Love-foe 1.00 70.00 25.72 22.28
Dislike-foe 1.00 100.00 42.00 35.78
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each individual comparison thresholded at P< 0.01 uncor-
rected, 10 voxels (see fMRI data analysis section). This test
revealed that BOLD signal in the right anterior cingulate
cortex (vACC: Talairach coordinates [10, 33, 5]) and left
pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA): Talairach coor-
dinates [6, 29, 39], was significantly correlated with obser-
vation of action errors (Figure 2) independent of the
psychological consequences of their observation. Activation
in these areas was also significant in the comparison
MISSALL–GOALALL, further corroborating their involvement
in processing of observed errors. In order to test whether
error-related activity in these areas was correlated with our
social measures, individual scores on the IRI and SSIS were
regressed against individual fMRI results in the MISSALL–
GOALALL contrast. BOLD signal at the vACC site identified
in the intersection analysis contrast was significantly pre-
dicted by scores on the empathic concern subscale of the
IRI. Specifically, BOLD signal negatively covaried with
empathic concern B¼0.544, P¼ 0.009. Collapsed across
the Friend/Foe dimension, activity in the pre-SMA site iden-
tified in this comparison was significantly and negatively
correlated with the empathic concern subscale of the IRI,
B¼.580, P¼ 0.005. When tested separately for Friend
and Foe we found that pre-SMA response to misses com-
mitted by friends covaried significantly with empathic con-
cern (B¼639, P¼ 0.001), whereas pre-SMA response to
misses committed by foes did not (B¼0.386, P> 0.05).
Activity at other sites found active in the
MISSALL–GOALALL comparison (Table 4) were not signifi-
cantly correlated with any subscales of the IRI.
Notably, activity in this contrast at these two MFC sites was
not significantly correlated with the self-identification scores
obtained from the SSIS (vACC, B¼0.194, P¼ 0.388; pre-
SMA, B¼0.140, P¼ 0.533). In order to test for areas
responding differentially to observed errors as a function of
the broader categorical metric of self-identification, we com-
pared miss-related activity for friends to miss-related activity
for foes using the contrast ([MISSFRIEND–GOALFRIEND]–
[MISSFOE–GOALFOE]). A single site in the left anterior
cingulate cortex (Talairach coordinates [13, 34, 13])
[dorsal to the vACC site reported above, and referred to
in this article as middle anterior cingulate cortex (mACC)]
showed increased BOLD signal for observation of errors
committed by friends relative to errors committed by
foes, P< 0.005 uncorrected, 10-voxel extent (Figure 3,
Table 4). The size of this effect was positively correlated
with individuals’ scores on the personal distress subscale of
the IRI, B¼0.552, P¼ 0.008 (Figure 4, Table 4). The reverse
contrast, ([MISSFOE–GOALFOE]–[MISSFRIEND–GOALFRIEND]),
did not reveal any areas in MFC that were more active for errors
committed by foes relative to those committed by friends.
In order to isolate areas in the MFC showing greater
activation following observed actions (of any sort) with
negative affective consequences we calculated the intersec-
tion (GOALFOE–MISSFOE) \ (MISSFRIEND–GOALFRIEND).
Table 3 Pearson correlations between various measures used in the current experiment. Significant correlations (2-tailed, P < .05) are shown in bold.
Measure Value IRI-EC IRI-PT IRI-FS IRI-PD SSIS Love(FR) Dislike(FR) Love(FO)
IRI-EC Pear. Corr. 1 – – – – –
Sig (2-tail) – – – – – –
IRI-PT Pear. Corr. 0.504 1 – – – – – –
Sig (2-tail) 0.010 – – – – – – –
IRI-FS Pear. Corr. 0.304 0.097 1 – – – – –
Sig (2-tail) 0.139 0.645 – – – – – –
IRI-PD Pear. Corr. 0.278 0.178 0.273 1 – – – –
Sig (2-tail) 0.178 0.394 0.187 – – – – –
SSIS Pear. Corr. 0.013 0.121 0.032 0.113 1 – – –
Sig (2-tail) 0.953 0.583 0.885 0.609 – – – –
Love(FR) Pear. Corr. 0.100 0.057 0.044 0.103 0.059 1 – –
Sig (2-tail) 0.643 0.792 0.839 0.632 0.804 – – –
Dislike(FR) Pear. Corr. 0.122 0.154 0.115 0.090 0.314 0.032 1 –
Sig (2-tail) 0.571 0.473 0.594 0.676 0.177 0.860 – –
Love(FO) Pear. Corr. 20.457 0.228 0.262 0.330 0.418 0.112 0.537 1
Sig (2-tail) 0.025 0.285 0.216 0.115 0.066 0.563 0.006 –
Dislike(FO) Pear. Corr. 0.374 0.063 0.233 0.376 0.457 0.364 0.057 20.450
Sig (2-tail) 0.071 0.789 0.273 0.070 0.043 0.074 0.787 0.024
FO¼ foe,
Fig. 2 Medial frontal sites at which BOLD signal was found to be significantly
different in the contrast Misses–Goals, independent of fandom (P_conjunc-
tion < .0001 uncorrected, 10-voxel extent]. (A) pre-SMA site (Talairach coordinates
[6, 29, 39]) (B) ventral anterior cingulate cortex site (Talairach coordinates [10, 33,
5]). Results are overlayed on the average normalized brain of the 23 participants.
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A similar conjunction of the reverse contrasts, (MISSFOE–
GOALFOE) \ (GOALFRIEND–MISSFRIEND) was used to
localize brain areas associated with positive affective conse-
quences of observed actions. No significant voxels survived
these intersection analyses, even when the most lenient sig-
nificance threshold (P< 0.05 uncorrected, 3-voxel extent)
was adopted, suggesting that the MFC was not modulated
by the affective consequences of error observation.
Additional contrasts were examined to characterize differ-
ences in BOLD signal associated with observation of players
(collapsed across successful and unsuccessful penalty shots)
with which participants either did or did not self-identify. A
random effects analysis of activity in the contrast (FriendALL–
FoeALL) revealed significant activations at sites in the bilateral
fusiform gyrus and the right inferior frontal gyrus extending
into the border with ventral premotor cortex, P< 0.001
uncorrected, 10-voxel extent (Figure 5, Table 4).
DISCUSSION
The primary goal of the current experiment was to assess the
role of medial prefrontal areas in the processing of errors and
their affective consequences independent of one another.
Two sites in the medial frontal cortex, vACC and pre-
SMA, responded to the observation of errors made by
friend and foe regardless of the valence of the affective con-
sequences associated with these actions. BOLD signal
recorded at both of these sites during error observation
was significantly correlated with participants’ scores on the
empathic concern subscale of the IRI. Although error-related
activity at these sites did not correlate with our continuous
measure of self-identification, an effect of this variable was
seen in the differential mACC activity in response to obser-
ving friends (as opposed to foes) commit an error. These
results have important implications for theoretical
Table 4 Table of brain activations in comparisons of interest used to address hypotheses in the current experiment. All coordinates are for peak values in a
cluster and are reported in Talairach space.
Brain Area z-score p.unc. size x y z
MISSALL–GOALALL
TPJ 3.73 <.001 26 63 39 29
IFG (p.oper.) 3.60 <.001 51 43 39 13
aITG 3.57 <.001 12 36 6 19
thalamus 3.54 <.001 10 6 12 6
putamen 3.42 <.001 12 11 10 0
pre-SMA 2.62 ¼.004 5 6 29 39
vACC 3.14 ¼.001 84 10 33 5
MISSFRIEND–GOALFRIEND]–[MISSFOE–GOALFOE]
thalamus 3.80 <.001 78 4 8 0
aITG 3.80 <.001 18 42 13 21
mACC 3.58 <.001 7 13 34 13
hippocampus 3.55 <.001 16 21 27 13
FriendALL–FoeALL
fusiform gyrus 4.17 <.001 1000 38 74 9
fusiform gyrus 3.68 <.001 269 41 55 9
IFG (p.oper.) 3.32 <.001 28 40 9 21
Results were thresholded at P < 0.001, uncorrected for multiple comparisons, minimum cluster size of 10. Values in bold represent instances in which P-values greater than or
equal to .001 and/or cluster sizes smaller than 10 voxels were considered significant based on a priori predictions. TPJ, temporoparietal junction; IFG (p.oper), inferior frontal
gyrus, pars opercularis; aITG, anterior inferior temporal gyrus; vACC, ventral anterior cingulate cortex; mACC, middle anterior cingulated cortex; IPL, inferior parietal lobe, SMG,
supramarginal gyrus.
Fig. 3 Results from the contrast (MISSFRIEND–GOALFRIEND)–(MISSFoe–GOALFoe),
P < .005 uncorrected (for illustration purposes, see Table 4 for exact P-values),
revealed a site in the left dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (Talairach coordinates
[13, 34, 13]), where response to errors was significantly greater when observing
friends vs foes. The size of the difference in this contrast was positively correlated
with the personal distress subscale of the IRI. Results are overlayed on the average
normalized brain of the 23 participants.
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discussions concerning the role of MFC in the processing of
errors and negative feedback which can best be understood
by examining their relation to earlier research on mental
representations and empathy.
Error observation, social learning and pre-SMA
In the current experiment pre-SMA activity associated with
the observation of action errors was not modulated by the
valence of the consequences. In a recent fMRI exper-
iment conducted by De Bruijn and colleagues (submitted
for publication) participants observed what was ostensibly
another person (but actually a computer mimicking the
behavior of a real participant) make errors in a simple com-
puter game in which they were required to precisely lineup a
moving triangle with a stationary target of varying size.
Comparison of brain activity associated with observation
of errors to brain activity associated with observation of
correct trials revealed signal difference at a pre-SMA site
precisely overlapping with the area reported in the current
experiment. Activation in the area around BA 32/6/8 has
often been reported in studies in which participants actually
commit errors (for a review see Ridderinkhof et al., 2004).
Importantly, Ridderinkhof and colleagues showed that this
area was not only activated following response errors, but
also following pre-response conflict, decision uncertainty
and negative feedback. These findings have led to the
recent interpretation that the posterior MFC signals the
need to change behavior in order to optimize future out-
comes (Ullsperger et al., 2004). Interestingly, the current
study shows that the same area is also activated by the obser-
vation of errors, in the absence of a requirement for beha-
vioral adjustments from the observer. As such, the current
findings are in line with a recent ERP study demonstrating
an ERN in response to errors made by others (Van Schie
et al., 2004). One may argue/speculate that the pre-SMA
activations in response to observed errors may help to pre-
dict future performance and may thus play a role in obser-
vation based learning. However, additional research is
needed to clarify the precise role of pre-SMA in error pro-
cessing and its relationship to observation based learning.
Fig. 4 Correlations between BOLD signal at MFC sites and subscales of the IRI. (A) Difference in BOLD response to errors in vACC (Talairach coordinates [10, 33, 5])
was negatively correlated with scores on the empathic concern subscale of the IRI. (B) Differences in BOLD response to errors committed by friends vs foes in dorsel anterior
cingulate cortex (dACC) (Talairach coordinates [13, 34, 13]) were positively correlated with personal distress subscores of the IRI. (C and D) Error-related activity was negatively
correlated with pre-SMA (Talairach coordinates [6, 29, 39]) activity for friends but not for foes.
Fig. 5 Figure showing bilateral fusiform gyrus and right inferior frontal gyrus
(pars opercularis) associated with the contrast FriendALL > FoeALL, P < .001 uncor-
rected, 10-voxel extent.
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Errors and empathy in the vACC
Brain activity at the vACC site (z< 2) was also found to be
associated with error observation in the current experiment.
This site is not typically considered an error processing
region per se, but rather is believed to be involved in empa-
thy and emotional aspects of cognition (Bush et al., 2000;
Jackson et al., 2006). In general, the attribution of such a role
is consistent with the current results which suggest that dif-
ferences in vACC signal associated with observation of errors
were significantly modulated by affective (i.e. empathy)
rather than cognitive components of error processing. This
idea is further corroborated by experiments involving emo-
tion processing which show modulation of activity at similar
sites by autonomous and visceral aspects of emotion (Bush
et al, 2000; Koski and Paus, 2000; Paus, 2001) as opposed to
the analytical/dispassionate processing of errors.
The dissociation between cognitive and affective aspects of
error processing is furthermore illustrated by subpopulations
showing abnormalities in ACC activity, such as obsessive-
compulsive disorder (OCD) patients. In these individuals,
the ACC has been found to be hyperactive at rest, during
symptom provocation, and after commission of errors in
cognitive tasks (Ursu et al., 2003). Using an error commis-
sion paradigm, Fitzgerald and colleagues (2005) found that
OCD patients showed higher error-related activity in vACC
sites (z<6) which were nearly overlapping with the vACC
region associated with error observation in the present study.
These authors suggest that, while OCD patients may be as
sensitive to errors as healthy controls (hence, no difference in
dorso-caudal ACC and pre-SMA activity), that subsequent
affective responses to these errors may be of a quantitatively
different nature. Based on these findings, vACC activity
might reflect an affective component of error processing
consistent with a recent meta-analysis of neuroimaging stud-
ies of emotion showing greater activity in the vACC for
responses to aversive stimuli (Wager et al 2003), as well as
fMRI and ERP studies implicating the vACC in affective
responses to errors (Kiehl et al., 2000; Luu et al., 2000a, b;
Luu et al., 2003; Luu and Pederson, 2004).
Self-identification and medial ACC
One of the main predictions of the current experiment was
that the MFC’s response to errors should be modulated by
the social construct of self-identification. Although we found
no significant correlations between brain activity and SSIS
scores, activity in medial ACC was greater during observa-
tion of errors committed by friends than by foes. This sug-
gests that, at a more discrete level, self-identification does
modulate error-related brain activity. Our results suggest
that the mechanism behind this effect may be related to
individual differences in empathy as measured by the IRI.
Specifically, the size of this difference was positively corre-
lated with participants’ scores on the personal distress sub-
scale of the IRI, which is thought to measure the egocentric
emotional reactivity and anxiety of an individual in response
to observed negative experiences of others. This finding is
consistent with results from a recent fMRI experiment by
Lawrence and colleagues (2006). These researchers found
an area of anterior cingulate cortex (Talairach coordinates:
[14, 26, 15]), close to the area found in the present experi-
ment (Talairach coordinates: [13, 34, 13]), in which BOLD
signal was significantly positively correlated with personal
distress and negatively correlated with measures of social
skills. According to Lawrence and colleagues, increased
blood flow at this anterior cingulate site may represent par-
ticipants’ attempts to regulate their own autonomic arousal.
This theory is based on the fact that activations at similar
ACC sites have been reported in relation to the representa-
tion and modulation of states of autonomic arousal (Frith
and Frith, 2003). In addition, as the personal distress scale is
a measure of self-oriented negative emotional experience
(Joireman et al., 2002; Guarino et al., 2007; Tangney et al.,
2007) this positive correlation between personal distress
scores and size of difference between mACC activation fol-
lowing errors by friend compared to errors by foe does fit
with our suggestion that self-identification is at play here.
Observation of errors committed by friends (persons with
whom the observer is likely to share a common goal) in the
current experiment likely elicited greater personal distress
and possibly greater attempts to regulate this response in
our participants.
Observation of friends
Another indication of the discrete level at which self-
identification was at play, was the greater brain activity
during observation of actions made by friends as compared
to those made by foes. Two sites of activation were associated
with viewing players (in general) with whom the participant
self-identified, namely the fusiform gyrus and inferior frontal
gyrus (pars opercularis). BOLD signal was greater in these
areas during perception of Friends in comparison to Foes.
Activity in the fusiform gyrus has been traditionally associated
with responses to human faces (Puce et al. 1996; Kanwisher
et al. 1997; Haxby et al., 2000; Kanwisher and Yodel, 2006 for
review). It has also been shown that BOLD signal in this area
may be modulated by familiarity of faces, although these
results are less consistent. Some experiments have shown
greater activation for familiar faces vs unfamiliar ones
(Lehmann et al., 2004; Avidan and Behrmaan, 2005) while
others have shown the reverse effect (Rossion et al., 2003)
or no difference at all (Eger et al., 2005; Pourtois et al.,
2005). The finding in the current experiment could be due
to the participants’ higher familiarity with faces on their
national teams. Importantly, the fusiform gyrus has been
shown to respond not only to faces, but also to the perception
of whole body movements (Peelen and Downing, 2004).
While the movements of players in the game were designed
to appear realistic, moves from individual players were not
recorded and built into individual Dutch and German player
models. Thus, the relatively greater response of the fusiform
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gyrus when viewing friends was likely not related to percep-
tion of familiar player movements, but rather to the familiar
appearance (e.g. facial characteristics, build and team colors)
of the soccer players. This finding is important because it is
consistent with the idea that virtual soccer avatars in the
video game were perceived as being familiar persons as
opposed to completely novel actors. This finding supports
the idea that use of virtual reality avatars may be a viable
method for studying brain correlates of social observation
and in this way contributes to ongoing debates concerning
the use of virtual reality in psychology (Tarr and Warren,
2002; Sanchez-Vives and Slater, 2005).
In addition to the fusiform gyrus, the right pars opercu-
laris was also activated to a greater extent when viewing
friends as compared to foes. Various researchers have sug-
gested that the mirror neuron system (MNS) plays a critical
role in the simulation of other persons’ movements during
action observation in a variety of contexts (Fadiga and
Craighero, 2005; Molnar-Szakacs et al., 2006). Critically,
such MNS mediated simulation appears to be greatest
when the actor is perceived as maximally similar to the
observer, e.g. biological stimuli typically activate the MNS,
while robotic stimuli do not (Tai et al., 2004). And observa-
tion of movements made by animals (perhaps because such
movements do not belong to the observer’s motor reper-
toire) does not drive the MNS in the same manner as obser-
vation of human movements (Buccino et al., 2004). The
current results are consistent with the idea that the human
MNS responds maximally to actions perceived as being
made by similar others in that the right pars opercularis
was maximally responsive when viewing players with
which the participant self-identified. Because action kine-
matics were identical in friend and foe conditions, differ-
ences in BOLD signal are not likely due to differences
based on the biological characteristics or the actors or on
any experience the participants may have had with such
movements. In general, this result suggests that the response
of the right anterior MNS is modulated by top down proces-
sing, such as the context in which an action is embedded.
This conclusion is consistent with recent data demonstrating
modulation of right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) activation
by contextual manipulation. In a recent experiment, this area
was found to be preferentially activated during the prepara-
tion and execution of complementary actions, e.g. actions
coordinated with another person (Newman-Norlund et al.,
2007). This activity may have reflected the recognition of an
action and the calculation of an appropriate motor response
based on the social context in which the action was
embedded. Of course, the participants in the current experi-
ment were not calculating motor responses based on the
observed actions. These results could be reconciled by mod-
ifying the role assigned to the right IFG by other researchers.
One possibility is that this area is responsible for a more
general process of integrating actions of self and other in
situations where the actions of the other are judged as
important/salient to the observer, or where the actor and
observer share similar goals. It must also be noted that dif-
ferences in attention to various aspects of the complex social
scene (e.g. goalie, ball, goal or player) may have partially
driven some of the current findings in the comparison of
friend and foe. Although, the lack of significant reaction time
or accuracy differences in the queries following 20% of trials
argues against this. Future experiments might acquire more
sensitive measures of attention, for example using eye-
tracking.
Empathic concern
An important part of our endeavor involved the analysis of
correlations between activity in our critical contrasts and the
social measure of empathy. Our data demonstrate that right
vACC and pre-SMA activity following observation of errors
in general negatively covaried with participants’ scores on
the empathic concern subscale of the IRI. Empathic concern
is operationalized as the tendency to experience feelings of
sympathy and compassion for unfortunate others (Davis,
1980). Empathic concern is, in a manner of speaking, related
to the experience of a complementary emotional response
(e.g. feeling compassion for an injured child) as opposed to
a mirroring of emotion. Importantly, this statement is fully
consistent with studies showing a relationship between the
MNS (Carr et al., 2003; Cox, 2007) which has been impli-
cated in the computation of both imitative and complemen-
tary responses (Newman-Norlund et al., 2007, 2008)
responses, and empathy.
Here, we propose that empathic concern can alternatively
be interpreted as a disposition to regulate negative affect,
both when trying to comfort an emotionally distressed
other and in situations of intrapsychic emotional distress
(Berne, 1964; Stewart and Joines, 1996; Hamers and
Sebregts, 2002). In line with this view, recent theoretical
papers (Decety and Lamm, 2006) discussing the functional
anatomical basis of empathy concluded that empathy relies
both on bottom-up information processing to allow the
experience of emotions in another person, as well as the
top-down capacity to regulate the perceived emotion. In
the current experiment, empathic concern may have been
involved in the regulation of evoked negative affect in
response to an observed miss. Specifically, participants
with a stronger disposition towards empathic concern may
have been better able to regulate this experience of increased
distress, resulting in attenuation of vACC activity during
observation of misses, and hence a smaller BOLD signal
difference following observation of errors compared to
goals in general. Supporting evidence for this logic comes
from Eisenberg et al. (2004), who demonstrated that individ-
uals who can regulate their own emotions are more likely to
experience empathy in social interactions with others. The
same inverse relationship was also found in OCD patients
who show limited capacity for empathic concern and have
high negative affect as well as a hyperactive vACC during rest
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and following commission of errors (DSM-IV; Shedler and
Westen, 2004; Fitzgerald et al., 2005). The distinction
between bottom-up and top-down mechanisms in empathy
may help to explain why empathic concern attenuated vACC
activity following misses of both friend and foe, but only
attenuated pre-SMA activity when observing friend.
Furthermore, as we will explain below, the same model
might also explain why, in previous studies, positive correla-
tions between empathy and activation of the ACC were found.
In a recent fMRI study by Cheng et al. (2007), physicians
who practice acupuncture were compared to naive partici-
pants while observing movies in which needles were being
inserted into different body parts. While activation in dorsal
anterior cingulate cortex was stronger for control subjects
than for physicians and positively correlated with the
amount of discomfort that subjects experienced, activation
in vACC was stronger for physicians than controls and was
negatively related to the amount of discomfort that partici-
pants experienced during video observation. These findings
suggest that vACC is mainly involved in down-regulating the
emotional response which was done more affectively by phy-
sicians than controls. Interestingly, similar results have been
reported for the experience of social pain resulting from
social exclusion from an online game (Eisenberger et al.,
2003). Furthermore, consistent with the complementary per-
spective in empathic concern (e.g. feeling compassion for an
injured child), preliminary findings from our laboratory
(Karremans et al, unpublished data) indicate that reminding
people of a secure attachment figure (e.g. his/her partner)
reduces pain and stress-related brain activation in conditions
of socially exclusion. These and other findings lead to the
tantalizing hypothesis that physical and social pain may
actually share a common neural and computational basis
(Eisenberger and Lieberman, 2004). Coming back to the
present study, the reason why vACC and pre-SMA, sites
which often show coactivation during error processing
tasks (Fitzgerald et al., 2005; Mars et al., 2005), show a dif-
ferent pattern of correlations with empathic concern may
simply be because of the greater sensitivity of the vACC to
the down-regulation of negative affect. That is, subjects with
a high disposition towards empathic concern are better able
to regulate their emotional response to the observation of a
miss than subjects with lower empathic ability (Eisenberg
et al., 2004). Hence, a possible explanation why enhanced
empathic concern may have attenuated pre-SMA activation
to misses might be because down-regulation in the vACC
spread to this more dorsal region of medial frontal cortex.
Lastly, we would like to address the apparent contradic-
tion between the current findings and the previous research
finding a positive correlation between empathic concern and
activation in the ACC (e.g. Singer et al., 2004). As already
indicated, heightened empathy may either enhance the
bottom-up properties of perceiving negative emotions in
others, or support the top-down suppression of negative
affect (cf. Decety and Lamm, 2006). It is well conceivable
that depending on the situation, the task or the nature of the
stimulus (e.g. whether subjects have any sense of control)
subjects may select different strategies for processing emo-
tional content in others. This may influence the balance
between bottom-up and top-down processes, which in
turn will affect the direction of the relation between
empathic concern and activation in the ACC. We hypothe-
size that in conditions that induce or allow subjects to select
a regulatory strategy, empathic ability will correlate nega-
tively with activation in vACC and possibly pre-SMA. On
the other hand, when conditions demand a lack of control or
emotional regulation, we should expect levels of empathic
concern to correlate positively with activation in vACC and
pre-SMA. This might be a topic of investigation for future
studies.
Positive vs negative affective consequences
It must be noted that the conjunction analyses in which we
attempted to isolate areas responsive to actions with either
positive (goal of a friend and miss of an enemy) or negative
affective consequences (miss of a friend and goal of an
enemy) did not reveal any significant activations even
when a very lenient threshold was adopted. One potential
explanation for this lack of finding is that the affective value
of misses made by the opposing team was not equal to the
affective value of goals made by the favored team. This
hypothesis is supported by research on gloating which sug-
gests that for such an equivalence to be achieved, an individ-
ual must envy the position of the other team (cf. Shamay-
Tsoory et al., 2007). It is entirely possible that participants in
the current experiment did not envy the foe team and this
could account for the lack of a result in the conjunction
analysis. Another possible explanation for this finding is
that some effects were diluted by the inclusion of trials in
which misses and goals were not interpreted as being parti-
cularly meaningful (for example, a goal or miss at the begin-
ning of a mini-game vs the end of a mini-game). Previous
literature has shown that the magnitude of an error does
indeed affect the neural response (Holroyd et al., 2004).
Accordingly, future explorations of this sort might record
physiological variables like heart rate and breathing, and
use these to categorize events in terms of their affective value.
General conclusion
In the present experiment, the brain correlates of error
observation were disentangled from the brain correlates of
negative consequences typically associated with them. Our
results indicate that sites in the MFC, including vACC and
pre-SMA respond to observed errors similarly regardless of
whether the error is interpreted as a positive or negative
event, and that the strength of such responses was signifi-
cantly modulated by participants’ capacity for empathic con-
cern. Our results also indicate that self-identification, at the
most general level, impacts the brain’s response to action
observation in general (e.g. bilateral fusiform gyrus and
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right pars opercularis), and observation of errors in particu-
lar (mACC). These results extend findings from previous
literature on error observation using electro-encephalogra-
phy (EEG) (van Schie et al., 2004) and comment on theories
of error processing in which the MFC is ascribed a central
role. The ability to interact with and learn from the observa-
tion of conspecifics depends critically on our ability to repre-
sent them as distinct entities. The current experiment raises
the tantalizing possibility that our own personal views of
others may bias action monitoring systems in a powerful
way. Future experiments might compare the neural basis
of error observation in situations where learning is likely
to be either beneficial or harmful. Also, experiments in
which participants are allowed the opportunity to adjust
their own behavioral plans based on observation of errors
could further specify the dynamics of human error proces-
sing mechanisms. Insights provided by such experiments
may have applications for theories which relate the percep-
tion and categorization of social entities (as friend or foe) to
their influence on specific socio-cognitive processes.
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